Do You Know the Burning Behavior of Your Dust? - The World's Portal for Handling Solids - SolidsOnline

Do You Know the Burning Behavior of Your Dust?

From Solidsonline.com a great article by John Astad of the Combustible Dust Policy Institute, about burning the behavior of combustible dust.

Burning behavior (BZ) of combustible particulate solids is an important property. A property that is evaluated when developing engineering and administrative control measures for protecting the work-place from combustible dust fire and explosion hazards. Burning behavior can be as harmless as salt (BZ 1) or violent as black powder (BZ 6). Where does your dust fit between the two?
Knowing fire spread characteristics with BZ classification (severity of consequence) acquired from VDI 2263 test results assist safety professionals with developing a proactive housekeeping strategy. This strategy includes removing excessive dust layers from hard to reach and unseen overhead areas such as suspended ceilings, conduits, and structural girders. It is these overhead areas where fire can spread rapidly.

Read more here

Revise Combustible Dust National Emphasis Program (NEP): Poll

Combustible Dust Explosions and Fires-ATEX:
Revise Combustible Dust National Emphasis Program (NEP): Poll

Combustible dust related fires and explosions are occurring throughout the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors that are not specifically recognized in Appendix D-1 & D-2 of the OSHA Combustible Dust National Emphasis Program (NEP).
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=directives&p_id=3830

Recently a CSB recommendation in the Hoeganaes Case Study instructed OSHA to revise the Combustible Dust National Emphasis Program (NEP) to add industry codes for facilities that generate metal dusts (e.g., North American Industrial Classification System, NAICS, code 331111 Iron and Steel Mills, and other applicable codes not currently listed)..

What about the dozens of other NAICS having a history of combustible dust related fires and explosions that are not recognized in the ComDust NEP?

Please participate in this poll by the Combustible Dust Policy Institute on LinkedIn:

Industrial Fire Prevention - Spark Detection & Extinguishment : Equipment

Industrial Fire Prevention - Spark Detection and Extinguishment : Equipment

Protect your plant, production, and personnel from combustible dust fires and explosions.

The GreCon Spark Detection and Extinguishing System can help prevent fires in your process conveying and dust collection systems.

For more information on Prevention, Mitigation, and Protection visit www.IndustrialFirePrevention.com.

For information on Combustible Dust visit www.IndustrialFirePrevention.Blogspot.com.

Contact:
Jeff Nichols
Industrial Fire Prevention, LLC
770-266-7223

Panel: Plant Owners Failed to Act before Accidents | Chem.Info

From Chemical.Info.

"...the company knew the dangers and "decided to take the risk,"

These accidents were Preventable.

If you handle or create combustible dust in your process, this story should have your interest. As a manufacturing community, no matter what we produce, we must police ourselves, or the government will do it for us, to prevent this kind of tragedy. The technology, standards, and know-how are available to help prevent these kinds of tragic accidents. That is why this blog, our website and company exists.  Lets put this safety technology and metodolgy to use. Lets help save your production, and your company's reputation.  Most importantly, lets help save lives. 


Panel: Plant Owners Failed to Act before Accidents | Chem.Info

NASHVILLE, Tenn. (AP) — Officials at a Tennessee metal powders factory where five people died in accidents last year knew about the explosive danger of dust that coated much of the plant but did little to reduce the risk, a federal investigative agency concluded.
The U.S. Chemical Safety Board on Thursday released its final report on three accidents over the first five months of 2011 at a Hoeganaes Corp. plant in Gallatin, about 25 miles northeast of Nashville.
The report found that the company was first prompted to test the dust problem in 2008 when it was pointed out in an insurance audit. Tests in 2009 and 2010 found the dust was combustible, and the company developed an aggressive plan of safety improvements, the majority of which had planned completion dates before the 2011 flash fires.
But Chemical Safety Board investigator-in-charge Johnnie Banks said the plan "was not implemented in ways that would manage the dust."
Much of the information in the final report had already been made public, including the causes of the three accidents. Airborne iron powder ignited and caused flash fires in January and March. In the case of a May fire, hydrogen leaking from a corroded pipe exploded and lofted dust into the air that then created a fireball.
The Safety Board criticized plant management for relying on inadequate safety measures, such as flame-resistant clothing, to protect workers.
"The injured and fatally injured employees were wearing the Hoeganaes-designated FRC at the time of the 2011 flash fire incidents," the report concluded.
In a news release, Hoeganaes, based in Cinnaminson, N.J., said it has since taken action to prevent future accidents and ensure the plant operates at "world class standards." Those actions include "the development of an industry leading powder metal dust management system."
Banks said the plant did show noticeable improvement between the time he first visited in early 2011 and his last visit in August, but he was not prepared to speculate on whether the plant was now completely safe for workers.
"I was afraid every time I went in there," he said, "and my team was too. You're walking through there and you're at a site where someone has suffered horrific injuries."
Currently there are no federal regulations specific to controlling the hazards from combustible dust in general industry, so any safety improvements companies chose to make are voluntary.
Federal figures show that deadly explosions from finely powdered food, wood, metals and chemical happen each year in the U.S., killing and maiming multiple workers.
In 2007, the Chemical Safety Board recommended that the U.S. Occupational Health and Safety Administration develop rules for preventing dust fires and explosions. Those rules still are under development.
That frustrates Safety Board Chairman Rafael Moure-Eraso. At the Thursday news conference, he said accidents like those at Hoeganaes are preventable, but many companies are not going to take the necessary safety measures unless they are required to.
In the case of Hoeganaes, the company knew the dangers and "decided to take the risk," he said.

NFPA's Guy Colonna details new committee structure for combustible dust ...

This is a great interview with Guy Colonna with the NFPA. He explains the NFPA's document structure for combustible dust.

There are eight NFPA documents that specifically address dust....and all of them address two hazards -- fires and explosions. Guy Colonna, head of NFPA's Industrial and Chemical Engineering Division, talks about a new committee structure that's in the works for NFPA's combustible dust documents.

"View your business as the market's most trusted, valued, and prized provider, advisor, and source: What you do is for a greater good, and you're truly being selfless in your business goal to serve the client better and more fully than any other competitor does." - Jay Abraham

Workplace Safety Toolkit

Workplace Safety Toolkit

Workplace Safety Is No AccidentAn Employer's Online Toolkit to Protect stakeholders.
Safety begins with corporate culture. This site is an excellent resource for your plant safety and health program.
It contains worksheets, checklists and information on a host of subjects related to health and safety including:

Foundational concepts such as Safety Policy, Job Descriptions, Safety Committees.

Concepts and Applications about how and why accidents happen, framework for safety culture, OSHA Fact Sheet and checklist, accident analysis and reporting.

And other Concerns and Issues such as ADA Compliance, pathogens, building maintenance, confined spaces, construction, drug free workplace, electrical safety, emergency action planning, ergonomics, fleet safety, food safety, hazardous and toxic substances, housekeeping, lockout/tagout, mold and mildew, off site assignments, portable power tools, PPE, security, workplace stress, and workplace violence.

Make sure and check it out. This site has the tools you need to help promote your safety culture, and keep your personnel safe.

From the Woodworking Network blog, a good article on OSHA press releases in which wood products firms have been cited for serious, repeat and/or willful safety and health violations.

What is your corporate safety culture like?

Only serious "continuous significant improvement", and benchmarking best engineering practices to your health and safety program will prevent these type OSHA violations and citations.  Ignorance and negligence of current NFPA Standards for combustible dust, dust collection and other safety practices is what causes OSHA to have to police your business.

Like Rich in this article, I shake my head every time I read one of these stories or press releases, and it is almost a daily occurrence.  The shame is that many of the events in these stories could have been prevented!

My business is in the field of combustible dust, and helping protect process conveying systems, and dust collection systems from fires and explosions. My primary focus is in prevention, and providing and applying fire and explosion prevention and protection systems. Our purpose is helping our clients and customers prevent process fires and explosions - "Saving Production - Saving Lives!"

From my point of view, business should be able to police itself, and has a moral obligation to protect its most valuable asset - human capitol, and not just employees, but all stakeholders who come onto your property.  Because of negligence by a few, now OSHA has to police our manufacturing community.

This is the kind of stuff that keeps me up at night. I have actually had plant managers tell me they would rather have their plant burn down rather than invest in appropriate safety systems to protect their production, people, and reputation!  I have seen the catastrophic effects and loss of life as a result of this type attitude toward safety. To me this type attitude is willful negligence.  Safety systems and procedures aren't an empty expense to your business, but part of your production systems, a valuable asset to help keep you in business, and your people safe. They are insurance.

My goal is to leave the the process industries safer then when I started.  Let me help you protect your process from fires and explosions. We are here to help.

-Jeff Nichols

Is Your Woodworking Plant OSHA Safe?

By Rich Christianson | 08/07/2011 2:00:00 AM
I don't think that owners and managers of woodworking businesses lie awake at night thinking of ways to make their plants more dangerous for their employees. Yet, it is also apparent that some woodworking business owners and managers could do more to make their shops a safer work environment.

This is why I shake my head every time I see an OSHA press release in which a wood products firm has been cited for serious, repeat and/or willful safety and health violations. Are managers of these plants that callous or is OSHA simply overzealous?

Considering the long list of potential hazards in a typical woodworking operation -- machine guarding; wood dust as both respiratory and combustible dust issues, noise pollution, eye safety, VOC emissions from finishes and adhesives, etc. -- it's almost impossible not to imagine that on any given day, any wood operation could be cited by an OSHA inspector for one or more health and safety violations. And the preceding list doesn't even include administrative requirements such as maintaining Material Safety Data Sheets on file, developing a hazardous communications program and providing workers with regular safety training.

Callous or Picked on?My head is still shaking after posting an OSHA press release about Northeastern Wisconsin Wood Products of Pound, Wi, which was recently cited for 18 alleged health and safety citations, including 13 willful violations, which OSHA defines as "one committed with intentional knowing or voluntary disregard for the law's requirements, or with plain indifference to worker safety and health."

The 13 willful violations cited against Northeastern Wisconsin Wood Products, including failure to provide workers with ear and eye protection;; lack of machine guards and guard rails; and accumulations of combustible dust;, carry penalties totaling $360,000 in proposed fines.

What makes this case particulary disconcerting is that OSHA had cited this firm for violations as early as 2006 and again in a follow-up inspection in 2007. In May 2010 the company was issued a secretary of labor petition for summary enforcement and granted 30 days to work with a Wisconsin state consultation service to abate the violations. According to OSHA, the consultation service fired the client "due to a lack of cooperation by the company."

When OSHA inspectors returned to the plant in January of this year, they identified the 18 violations, many of which OSHA noted were for the same safety and health issues it had originally written the company up for in 2006.

Incredible. Five years after being told where it was deficient in employee health and safety and many of the same problems continued to persist.

Adding insult to injury, OSHA this time also cited the company for a repeat safety violation carrying a proposed penalty of $7,920 for failing to provide potable water for drinking, plus three serious violations for failing to periodically inspect energy control procedures, use group lockout devices and train employees in electrical safety.

I would hope that Northeastern Wood Product managers have answers to explain their apparent disregard or inability to correct the deficiencies pointed out by OSHA inspectors.

'Worst Case Scenario'Northeastern Wood Products is hardly alone and as bad as it seems, another wood product company's predicament stands out in my mind as "the worst case scenario."

You may recall reading Woodworking Network's report about Phenix Lumber of Phenix City, AL, which was fined $1.9 million by OSHA willful violations in June "for egregious and other safety violations, including exposing employees to amputation and fall hazards." OSHA said while investigating the report of an employee who lost a finger in Phenix Lumber's planer mill, it learned of a second employee who had lost part of his hand working in the mill.

In citing Phenix Lumber for 24 willful violating, OSHA noted that the company had been been cited 77 times by the safety agency for serious safety and health violations since 2007, including for machine guard and lock-out/tag-out problems that if corrected might have prevented the amputation injuries.

The $1.9 million in proposed penalties was lumped on top of $439,400 in OSHA fines that Phenix Lumber received for relative to a fatal forklift injury and the case of a worker who was critically injured in a debarker machine accident.

Phenix Lumber issued a statement that it "has continued to significantly improve its safety and health program especially over the past year. Specifically, it has continued to revise its safety policies and procedures and to address OSHA concerns, has trained and retrained all of its employees and managers including the OSHA 10-hour safety training course, has provided additional personal protective equipment to all its employees and is providing weekly safety talks to all employees."

Maybe if Phenix Lumber had "continued to significantly improve its safety and health program" beginning after the initial OSHA violations in 2007, one or more of the tragedies at its plant would have been averted.

The bottom line is that while OSHA has a relatively small inspection crew, and many wood shops never see hide nor hair of an OSHA inspector, an OSHA inspection is just an accident or whistle from a disgruntled current or ex-employee away. And once a company is on OSHA's radar it remains there for years to come. Just ask the managers at Northeastern Wisconsin Wood Products and Phenix Lumber.

As the old saying goes, "Safety is no accident." Be sure to do regular audits of your operation to be OSHA safe, including meeting all of the record and reporting requirements. It's a huge task, but one that when done should help you sleep better.

Read more of Rich Christianson's blogs.

So you want to build a biomass plant?

So you want to build a biomass plant? - TimberBuySell.com - the portal for timber, logs and woody biomass

In this article from TimberBuySell.com, Paul Janz with Ausenco Sandwell in Vancouver, BC gives you a quick overview of all the complexities involved.

A Beginners Guide to the Project Development Process

With the current emphasis on producing `green energy from biomass and the subsequent government grants and subsidies available to promote the idea, a lot of well-meaning but inexperienced entrepreneurs are promoting the construction of plants that will process biomass into one form or another.

There are some basic steps that all projects go through, from concept to start-up, whether the `builder is new to the process or whether it is a company with a well formulated plan for development. Following is a brief description of the project development process.

Dust explosions explained | Characteristics, ignition and effects

Dust explosions explained | Characteristics, ignition and effects

From the Dust Explosion Info website a great article on characteristics of explosions,  explosion concentrations, ignition of dust clouds, and the effects of explosions.

This website is an excellent starting point for those wanting to know more about explosions, the physical characteristics of an explosion, the necessary conditions for an explosion to occur, potential ignition sources, dust explosion statistics, flammability, risk assessment, dust explosion prevention and protection, standards, and hazardous area classification.

OSHA Should Beware of Combustible Trust

Combustible Trust

From Material Handling and Logistics and the MHL.com blog, is an interesting piece on why OSHA removed powered industrial trucks from the latest Combustible Dust status report in the rulemaking process.

OSHA Should Beware of Combustible Trust

Tom Andel

September 9th, 2011

That old line about the sliding scale of untruths—lies, damn lies and statistics—is fun to use when someone quotes a number to support their argument. How many times have you read an article that debunks a widely-believed statistic? A few years ago chocolate was bad for you. Too much sugar, caffeine and empty calories. Now the conventional wisdom is that chocolate is good for you. Its antioxidants will help you live to 150. That’s if you don’t get killed in an industrial dust explosion first.
That was another popular belief a couple years ago—that lift trucks were involved in many of the combustibe dust violations found by OSHA inspectors. That stat was reported in a status report OSHA published in 2009 on its Combustible Dust National Emphasis Program.

“Employers were cited for violations of personal protective equipment, electrical equipment for hazardous (classified) locations, first aid, powered industrial trucks, and fire extinguisher standards during these inspections,” the report stated. It documented this with a chart showing Powered Industrial Trucks responsible for 236 violations—third behind hazardous chemicals and Housekeeping.
Recently, John Astad, an expert on the hazards of combustible dust whom I’ve quoted in previous blogs, e-mailed me a new version of this report. It had the same chart, but the industrial trucks category was missing. He was concerned that, whether this were a mistaken or an intentional omission on OSHA’s part, that it could lower a user’s guard about the dangers of using spark-ignited engines in dusty environments and leave them vulnerable to citations.
Astad is sensitive to irregularities in OSHA stats, citing one in particular which states that 90% of combustible dust related incidents result in injuries or fatalities. This is diametrically opposed to his own research done in 2008 where he found that fewer than 10% of ComDust related incidents resulted in injuries or fatalities.
I checked with my source at OSHA, and after a little investigation, here’s what he found out about that chart from which the industrial trucks category was removed:
“After reviewing the data on which the bar chart was based, it was concluded that powered industrial trucks were involved in not 236 violations, but only 24 violations,” he told me. “In other words, 212 of the 236 combustible dust related violations attributed to powered industrial trucks had nothing to do with combustible dust. This error was rectified in our revision, in May of 2010.”
I share this with you as a reminder to keep that salt shaker handy next time you’re being fed statistics. Numbers go down easier with large grains of salt.

System Safety Skeptic - Lessons Learned

System Safety Skeptic - Lessons Learned

"Effective system safety efforts require learning from failure"

From Terry Hardy and the "System Safety Skeptic" Blog, an article on the lessons learned from the chemical explosion at the 1999 Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, TN.

Lesson Learned: Analyses after accidents often show that clues existed before the mishap occurred. Such clues frequently take the form of anomalies observed during the life cycle of a project. An anomaly is an apparent problem or failure that occurs during verification or operation and affects a system, a subsystem, a process, support equipment, or facilities. Anomaly or problem reporting and corrective action, therefore, can play an important role in system safety analyses. An effective anomaly report and corrective action process not only allows for the reporting of problems, but also implements a closed-loop process for finding and fixing the root cause of a problem. In the case of this accident, if the near misses had been properly reported and analyzed, this accident may have been prevented.

Explosions, fires kill 47% more workers in 2010

Explosions, fires kill 47% more workers in 2010

From Woodworking.com and Woodworking Network, an article based on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries, shows 47% rise in fire and explosion deaths in 2010.


WASHINGTON — Work-related fatalities resulting from fires and explosions increased dramatically from 113 in 2009 to 187 in 2010 -- the highest count since 2003, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries.
This 47% rise in fire and explosion deaths stands out from the rest of the report which indicated that job-related deaths held steady from 2009 to 2010. In fact, four fewer workers died on the job in 2010 than in 2009, 4,547 compared to 4,551 respectively.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration is continuing to study the potential of developing a combustible dust standard that could impact the woodworking and other industries.
The top five causes of work-related deaths are:

• Transportation incidents, 1,766;
• Assaults and violent acts, including homicides, 888;
• Contact with objects and equipment, including getting caught in equipment or struck by projectile, 732;
• Falls, 635; and
• Exposure to harmful substances or environments, 409.

Three hundred and 20 deaths occurred in manufacturing compared to 768 in mining, 751 in construction, and 586 in agriculture and forestry.
View the Bureau of Labor Statistics report on occupational fatalities.

It's Only DUST! What's the big deal?

"It's only DUST! What's the big deal? Under the right conditions, many types of industrial dust, including coal, paper, and wood dust, can ignite and produce a devastating explosion. With our Combustible Dusts course, you'll learn to identify the hazards of combustible dust by using the Dust Fire and Explosion Pentagon. You'll get a clear understanding of dust control and preventions measures as well as dust analysis and explosion risk reduction. Our course will also help identify additional risks and prevention techniques associated with primary and secondary dust explosions.
Based on OSHA's ""Status Report on Combustible Dust National Emphasis Program"" and ""Hazard Communication Guidance for Combustible Dusts."""

From the Combustible Dusts Safety Video - BuisnessTrainingMedia.com
It's Only DUST! What's the big deal?

Category » Dr. Gerd Mayer « @ Ask The Experts

From Poweder and Buld Solids "Ask The Experts" Blog, here is a great seires of questions about dust collectors and combustible, answered by Dr. Gerd Mayer with Rembe, Inc.

Category » Dr. Gerd Mayer « @ Ask The Experts

Explosion Venting/Suppression Q&A

• If you have an existing dust collector with no provisions for handling explosive/combustible dust and you test your dust and find out it is combustible, what are the issues to consider in determining if the system can be modified to handle explosive dust or if it needs to be replaced with a new system?

  Under typical circumstances where you have complete information about your dust collector, such as the strength of the collector, retrofitting should be no problem. In that situation, in accordance with NFPA standards 654, 68, 69, and perhaps other standards that specifically address your industry, a dust collector must be vented/suppressed and isolated ( the inlet always needs to be isolated; the clean air side must be isolated if it is a return-air installation). If the dust collector is inside, the dust collector might be vented through a duct to the outside, an indoor flameless vent can be installed or chemical suppression might be used. If the dust collector is located outside, explosion panels or flameless vents can be used depending on the proximity to other structures and people. NFPA standard 68 provides the method by which to calculate the required vent areas.
  If you are in a situation where you don’t know the strength of the dust collector and you have no way of finding out the strength, you will either need to have an engineering analysis done on the dust collector or replace the collector to be absolutely sure you are properly calculating the vent area. There is no way to calculate the vent area if you don’t know the strength of the dust collector, and effective vent area is the critical component to minimizing damage to people and structures should there be a combustible dust explosion in the dust collector. In that case, you may decide you are better served by replacing the dust collector but you will still need to equip the collector with the appropriate venting/suppression and isolation equipment as indicated above.
  Note: Even if you have all the information about your dust collector, you may find that the strength of the dust collector is such that it is more cost effective to increase the strength of the collector to reduce the costs of equipping with explosion protection equipment or to buy a new collector and properly equip it to protect it.
  

• 

  If an existing older dust collector is collecting dust that can explode, is it better to upgrade the existing dust collector with explosion protection or buy a new one that already has the explosion protection built in?

  Per NFPA regulations, each enclosure containing a combustible particulate has to be vented or suppressed, no matter how old the enclosure is. In the case of a dust collector, if the reduced pressure (Pred) for the existing dust collector can be determined either by the manufacturer’s specifications or through a structural analysis, the old dust collector can be upgraded and still be used. In some cases, the cost to determine the Pred could be quite high, and the dust collector may need too much “strengthening” or other redesign—retooling doors that will not withstand explosions, for example, so that purchasing a new dust collector could be the more economic solution. Whether you retrofit an old dust collector or install a brand new one: either one of them has to include explosion protection and explosion isolation.
  

• This question pertains to dust collectors that are 8 ft in diam. and 11 ft high. Currently our dust collector bags are at the same elevation as the explosion vents. We are considering a modification - increasing the air to cloth ratio by increasing the length of the bags, hence increasing the height of the dust collector housing. Are there any regulations that require the explosion vents to be mounted lower than the bottom of the dust collector bags?

  NFPA Standard 68 gives you precise guidelines for how explosion vent panels should be installed. The goal of NFPA Standard 68, 8.7.1 is to prevent the bags from blocking the vent such that the bags might be “sucked through” the vent if there is an incident.
  Explosion vent panels should be installed underneath the bottom of the filter bags as described in NFPA Standard 68, 8.7.1. If, for any reason, there is not enough space to install the panels underneath the filter bags, you may, per NFPA Standard 8.7.1 (2), install the panels along the dirty air wall if “… bags are either completely removed or shortened so that they do not extend below the top of the vent for a distance of one vent diameter from the vent. In addition, bags immediately adjacent to the vent shall be removed and the remaining bags shall be restrained from passing through the vent.” NFPA Standard 68, 8.7.1(2), 2007 edition.
  Another acceptable explosion vent panel placement option, per NFPA Standard 8.7.1 (3): “…the bottom of the vent(s) is at or above the bottom of the bags,…and the row of bags closest to the vent are restrained from passing through the vent… For this case, the volume used to calculate the vent area shall be the entire volume (clean and dirty) below the tube sheet.”

Sawdust Cannon

From Navy Island, Inc., a MN manufacturer of veneers and doors. Excellent example of a controlled wood dust explosion. Notice how the flame front moves through the suspended dust. This is a perfect example how a flame front will travel in a primary or secondary explosion. Click on the link to see the original:

Sawdust Cannon


Or watch this YouTube video:

Non-compliance can be expensive

From InsuranceJournal.com comes a story about a judge who ruled in favor of the insurance company after a fire, when a company had not updated it's protection systems. This could also apply to the process industries. Think about what this could mean for your company. If you think compliance is expensive, look at the cost of non-compliance.

Massachusetts Judge: Obsolete Fire-Suppression Means No Claims Paid

A Massachusetts restaurant owner who failed to upgrade his obsolete fire suppression system was not entitled to collect insurance money after a massive fire six years ago — and must return $15,000 advanced to him by his insurer, an appeals court judge ruled.
At issue is an exclusion in a commercial lines policy issued to the French King restaurant in Erving, which required the restaurant owner to maintain a fire suppression system. The insurer — Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., a subsidiary of Fireman’s Fund — claimed that the fire-suppression system installed at the restaurant was obsolete, and therefore triggered the exclusion and did not require them to indemnify the restaurant.
Lawyers for Interstate argued that the restaurant owners and managers knew the system was obsolete and failed to correct problems that might have averted a fire that caused substantial damage to the restaurant in October 2005, when the system failed to function properly.
A so-called “dry” fire-suppression system, manufactured by Kidde, had been installed in the restaurant since before 1974. In 2000, the manufacturer recommended that all dry systems be upgraded to “wet” ones. Two years later, it ceased supporting, inspecting and repairing dry systems.
In 2004, the state’s Executive office of Public Safety issued a bulletin saying that dry systems were no longer supported by manufacturers, and were no longer in compliance with National Fire Protection Association codes — a requirement in the Bay State.
In 2003, the company hired by French King to service its dry system told the restaurant owners that the system was no longer in compliance and needed upgrading to a wet system — an estimated cost of $3,250. A year later, a building inspector told the restaurant it could no longer issue an inspection certificate because of the obsolete “dry” system.
A previous insurer — MassWest — had non-renewed the restaurant’s policy in 2002 because its system was out of date.
Following the fire, Interstate initially advanced the restaurant a $15,000 payment. But following an investigation of the fire suppression system, it declined to pay the claim and sought to recover the money it had paid.
French King sued the insurer and two superior court judges ruled in favor of the insurance company — finding that the system was no properly maintained and that the money should be repaid. Appeals Court Justice Francis Fecteau affirmed those rulings.
“There is nothing in the record that indicates that this was an unconditional advancement, especially because the (insurer) had not commenced investigating why the fire suppression system did not work,” he wrote in his opinion on the case. “There was evidence that the plaintiff did, in fact, know that there could be potential issues with the Kidde system” thus Interstate “was entitled to reimbursement of $15,000.”

Georgia Biomass Explosion

From the Florida Times Union and Jacksonville.com, a brief story about the explosion at Georgia Biofuels.  Pelletizers, dryers, grinders, pellet coolers, dust collection systems, and storage silo's are main concerns for safety systems to prevent fires and explosions at biomass pellet plants. This fire appears to have started in one of the pellet mills or "pelletizers" which extrude wood dust into pellets at high speed creating friction and heat. The fire was then likely transferred to the pellet coolers and dust collection systems which contain combustible dust in suspension causing the deflagration.

-Jeff Nichols


Overheated assembly caused Georgia Biomass explosion | jacksonville.com

By Teresa Stepzinski

Wood pellet production should resume today at Georgia Biomass, which was crippled by a dust explosion last month. The plant is near Waycross.
"We're ramping up now ... starting the equipment and getting it all ready to go," plant manager Ken Ciarletta said about noon Tuesday.
No one was injured in the early morning explosion June 20, which damaged some of the processing equipment at the plant that employs about 80 people.
An investigation revealed that an overheated roller/bearing assembly in a pelletizer sparked the blast at the factory, Ciarletta said.
No employees were laid off while production was shut down at the plant, he said.
As equipment was repaired and modifications made to prevent a recurrence, employees went through training and worked in other areas of the plant, he said.
He wouldn't reveal the cost of the damage, saying it was proprietary information. Ciarletta did say "the capital damage was comparatively low and has been repaired."
Georgia Biomass is a subsidiary of RWE Innogy of Germany, one of the top five electricity and gas companies in Europe. An estimated $175 million investment, the plant is in the Waycross-Ware County Industrial Park about five miles west of Waycross off U.S. 82 and U.S. 1.
The plant began operating May 12. Using yellow pine timber from throughout Southeast Georgia, its goal is to produce about 750,000 tons of wood pellets annually. Wood pellets are used as fuel - a cleaner-burning substitute for coal - primarily in Europe.

Read more at Jacksonville.com: http://jacksonville.com/news/georgia/2011-07-13/story/overheated-assembly-caused-georgia-biomass-explosion#ixzz1SeuqV33r

Workplace Safety * Consider Inherent Safety at Your Plant

Workplace Safety | Consider Inherent Safety at Your Plant | Chemical Processing

From CheicalProcessing.com, an excellent article on Inherent Safety Design (ISD).  Here are a few important highlights for ISD.  This article has been condensed for space, for the full article, click on the link above.


Consider Inherent Safety at Your Plant

Many sites can benefit -- but confusion about how to identify options stymies efforts.

By Dennis C. Hendershot, process safety consultant.

Inherently safer design (ISD) is a philosophy for designing and operating a safe process plant [1,2]. ISD aims to eliminate or significantly reduce hazards, rather than managing them with hardware and procedures. When feasible, ISD provides more robust and reliable risk management and, by eliminating costs associated with safety equipment and procedures, may make processes simpler and more economical.

Levels of Inherent Safety
Used during detailed equipment configuration and design, it can eliminate or significantly reduce many risks within a process that still contains major hazards.


You can classify levels of ISD as follows:
• First-order inherent safety — eliminating hazards from the process altogether;
• Second-order inherent safety — reducing the magnitude of a hazard, or making it extremely unlikely, perhaps nearly impossible, for an accident to occur; and
• Layers of protection — making passive, active and procedural risk-management safeguards inherently more reliable and robust.

Many opportunities exist to design a more robustly safe plant by applying second-order strategies and even by using ISD thought processes during design of safety hardware and procedures that manage risk of major inherent hazards.


Implementing ISD
In an ideal world, plant designers and operators would think about ISD throughout the process design and operational lifecycle; specific ISD review tools wouldn't be needed. But, in the real world, most facilities already exist and ISD wasn't considered during their design, or companies and engineers aren't familiar with ISD and don't look for opportunities in process design. Specific ISD review tools can help overcome these problems. Chemical engineers have used three approaches for implementing ISD in new and existing plants:
1. An inherent safety analysis of a process using an ISD checklist;
2. An independent process hazard analysis (PHA) for a plant focusing on ISD; and
3. A complete PHA of the plant with ISD considerations fully incorporated into the PHA discussions.

ISD checklist analysis. A checklist is a common PHA technique and can serve to identify ISD options. The checklist is best used in a team setting, with a variety of people familiar with all aspects of the plant and process considering the questions on the checklist. Treat it as as a "creative checklist" — in other words, use it to prompt creative thinking by the team, not just "yes" or "no" responses.

An extensive checklist of practical inherent safety considerations. It's organized around four major ISD strategies as well as plant geography:

• Substitute;
• Minimize;
• Moderate;
• Simplify; and
• Location, siting and transportation.

 It's important to make sure use of checklists doesn't limit team creativity. No general checklist can identify every potential ISD option for a specific process — the review team itself will have more knowledge about the plant and should use the checklist as a tool to facilitate creative thinking about how to eliminate or reduce hazards.

Independent ISD PHA.  This type of a review - also a team activity - focuses on specific hazards associated with the process and applies ISD strategies (substitute, minimize, moderate, simplify) to identify ways of eliminating or minimizing them. It uses one of the standard PHA tools (e.g., What If, Hazop) to pinpoint hazards but team discussion centers on ISD considerations.

CCPS has published another useful tool for consideration of ISD [4]. This book provides a series of tables of potential failure mechanisms for a wide range of process equipment and identifies potential design solutions, including inherent, passive, active and procedural approaches to managing risk.

Plant PHA incorporating ISD.  My personal preference is to minimize (an ISD strategy!) the proliferation of process reviews that seem to be required by the many demands being made on plant designers and operators. Plants are asked to do PHA, reliability and maintenance evaluations, ISO certification reviews, and now it's suggested (or required in some jurisdictions) ISD studies. Many of these use similar techniques. Combining them as much as possible increases efficiency and yields a better review. All reviews aim to accomplish the same thing — excellence in manufacturing, which includes best possible safety, environmental performance, product quality, productivity, plant reliability and profitability. These multiple demands often result in design or operational changes that improve performance in several areas simultaneously - e.g., a change boosting reliability and profitability also may enhance safety. But this isn't necessarily always true. So, it makes sense to consider as many of the competing performance demands as possible with a team having a broad understanding of the benefits and costs in all important performance areas.

Failure Modes of Equipment Reliability Processes

From ReliablePlant.com a great and timely article outlining various Failure Modes including not understanding the Equipment Reliability Process, and related to combustible dust fires and explosions not understanding Mechanical Ignition sources. For the full article click on the link above.

Failure Modes of Equipment Reliability Processes

Gary Fore, CMRP Bill Hillman

Most equipment failures are a result of failed reliability processes. This article covers many of the reasons why equipment reliability processes fail. The authors have personally observed all of the reasons for reliability process failure discussed in this paper.

Failure Mode: Implementation Failure
It can be rightfully argued that all equipment reliability process (EqRP) failure modes are somehow tied to poor implementation. Not establishing an initial direction is a critical mistake in the implementation process. Establishing clear goals and expectations and a clear direction can increase the success rate of an EqRP. If upper management fails to communicate the expectations of the program, accountability can never be achieved. The authors have witnessed millions of dollars being dumped into reliability processes that had no established direction and goals. The Penn State manual Operating Equipment Asset Management identifies some critical elements that should not be overlooked when instituting the EqRP.

Top-down vision, drive, participation, support and clear, ambitious objectives are elements that should not be overlooked on implementation. It’s a good idea to examine this entire publication before implementing an EqRP.

Failure Mode: Not Understanding the EqRP (Equipment Reliability Process)
Sometimes a company will have the best of intentions for implementing an EqRP, but no one in the company may have an understanding of how machine reliability is achieved. Sometimes a person in the company may have the necessary knowledge, but they are overruled on important issues that could insure success of the EqRP. Knowing how to maintain equipment for the desired reliability requires knowledge that is acquired through training. If that knowledge isn’t present, no EqRP will bring plant reliability. There are a few good ways to maintain machines and thousands of poor ways, but there is only one best way for any given machine. It is critical to choose one of the good processes and work toward making it the best EqRP for your plant. In short, it isn’t possible to maintain a machine to required reliability if machine reliability isn’t fully understood. If managers and plant personnel don’t truly understand the EqRP, they will lack confidence in the process and will be destined to failure. Many EqRPs fail simply because the managers and practitioners don’t have confidence that it can deliver the required results.

Failure Mode: Lack of Accountability
These days, we hear much about empowerment self-direction. This sometimes leads to the idea that everyone can do their own thing as long as they do those things with good intentions. The authors are strongly in support of empowerment and a self-directed workforce as long as the empowered conform to the directives of the EqRP. The EqRP is not perfect and will need to be continuously revised and improved, but the basic framework, if correct when chosen, should remain intact. Any modification should be subject to a formal management of change. Everyone in the plant needs to be held accountable for their work.
Corporate managers often fail to keep the EqRP on track by letting small factions steer off course with practices that vary from the EqRP. This is the result of the corporate manager either not understanding the EqRP or not having confidence in the EqRP. Too often, corporations turn over the management of an EqRP to managers who have had success in non-maintenance areas, but have little or no reliability experience. Combine the lack of reliability experience with no established goals or direction and you have induced a failure mode right out of the gate. How can people be held accountable when they don’t know what is expected from them?

Failure Mode: Market Conditions Cause a Change in Plans
Too often, companies are willing to invest in various programs when times are good. Sometimes this is even to the point of waste. But when markets go sour, policies are changed in order to conserve dollar assets. In such times, EqRPs may have funds cut to the point that past gains are lost. The EqRP may not survive a bad market. Companies should develop spending strategies that are stable regardless of market conditions. A wasted dollar can never be recovered. Some producer will sell products even in down markets. The lowest-cost, highest-quality producers will survive difficult times. A good EqRP is an important factor in enabling a company to be the low-cost, high-quality producer.

Failure Mode: Commitment Falters over Time
When mangers fail in the implementation of the reliability process, it allows other failure modes to begin eroding the program. If the direction and expectations are not initially established, accountability has no teeth. Without accountability, the commitment from upper management becomes viewed by the people as being more relaxed with each and every sunrise. Before long, even upper management forgets the initial purpose of the program. As the perceived importance of the EqRP lessens, the commitment is shifted to other programs or issues.

Failure Mode: Failure to Measure Results
You can’t measure what you can’t quantify, and what gets measured gets done. The difference between a well-designed metrics system and a poor one can be detrimental to improvement efforts. A metric is essentially a clear, quantitative, objective measure to assess performance in a particular area or progress toward a goal. A good computerized maintenance management systems (CMMS) coordinator can pay big dividends when helping establish metrics and deciding how data needs to be measured within the CMMS. Most systems can generate good, consistent reports if it is set up to do so. However, most of these systems are grossly underutilized, and companies are too dependent on CMMS coordinators to decide what can be measured and what can’t be measured. The metrics should be established by a committee with the EqRP goals in mind.
Six Sigma has been used on the process side in a lot of companies for sometime now. It could be argued that the utilization of black belts and green belts on the maintenance side could be beneficial, and in some companies, they are utilized in that capacity. But in the author’s experience, that generally was not the case. Managers sometimes concentrate on standard deviation of product moisture content and overlook mean time between failures. Assessment results can’t be consistent without good, solid metrics. Too many times, the authors have witnessed variations in assessment scores from one facility to the next because of inadequate metrics, peer pressure and managerial perception. Nothing can compromise the integrity of an assessment process more than the perceived inconsistencies of the assessment team’s scoring procedures.

Failure Mode: Cultural Integration
A company may establish a reliability steering committee, select champions and mentors, even train their entire workforce on cultural change. They may then hire outside people to oversee the EqRP. Is it really a good idea to hire outside people to fill roles such as plant reliability engineers, planners, schedulers, plant managers and maintenance managers, especially, if these people have little or no reliability experience? Sometimes the outside people may come from a completely different industry that doesn’t understand the manufacturing process or from the same industry but from a run-to-fail culture. Fosters of EqRPs should guard against infiltration of cultural integration. If people are brought in from different cultures, they should be in complimentary roles and trained in the company’s culture before taking on major roles in the EqRP. Too often, a little outside influence causes regression back into the run-to-fail maintenance of yesterday. 

Failure Mode: Lack of a Strategy for Managing Equipment
Even though condition-based monitoring methods may be established, strategies for managing equipment are still needed. Condition monitoring is a requirement for good machine management, but other strategies also should be incorporated into the EqRP. Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM) and Total Productive Maintenance (TPM) are two good tools that should be considered to help with the management of equipment reliability. Consider setting up pilot machine centers and conduct RCM or TPM projects. The information learned from these pilot projects can then be transferred to similar machine centers in other facilities.

Failure Mode: Low-Hanging Fruit Syndrome
When these types of programs are initiated, the benefits are quite obvious. Just about everything attempted – from instituting an oil cleanliness program to condition monitoring or failure analysis – reaps big initial benefits and everyone is happy. But, just as soon as the low-hanging fruit is picked, a program with no direction or structure starts to look more like a dog chasing its tail. Unfortunately, this happens too often in industry. Someone suggests an EqRP and it seems like a good idea when you look around and see all of the potential for improvement. But, the EqRP is an ever-changing process and every bit of beneficial juice has to be squeezed out of the reliability process.
Both authors agree that all of the potential failure modes of an EqRP seem to point to several key elements, such as commitment to reliability, accountability and sustainability. We have witnessed some success and eventual regression of EqRPs based on some or all of these failure modes. There are other failure modes, but the ones mentioned here have been witnessed by the authors.

About the authors:
Gary Fore, CMRP, has 22 years in the energy and building products industries, specializing in reliability engineering with a heavy emphasis on condition monitoring. He holds a bachelors of science degree in mechanical engineering and an associates of applied science in electro-mechanical technology. His certifications include: Certified Maintenance and Reliability Professional (Society for Maintenance & Reliability Professionals), Category III vibration analyst (Vibration Institute), CLS (Certified Lubrication Specialist), Level II infrared thermographer, and Machine Lubricant Analyst Level I (International Council for Machinery Lubrication).
Bill Hillman has 30 years experience in the steel industry and six years in the wood products industry. His entire career has been in equipment asset management, of which more than 20 years have been in predictive maintenance. Bill is a Certified Maintenance and Reliability Professional, past chairman on the board of the International Council for Machinery Lubrication, certified by the Society of Tribologists and Lubrication Engineers, and a certified infrared thermographer. He holds or previously held certifications by the Vibration Institute, NDT in ultrasonics, magnetic particle testing, and liquid penetrant testing. He is trained in Reliability-Centered Maintenance and is an experienced RCM facilitator. Bill is also trained in Total Productive Maintenance and 5-S. He is now a managing partner of Asset Management Specialists Company. Bill can be contacted at billcmrp@yahoo.com or 903-407-9488.
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This is an excellent article outlining various Failure Modes, I would suggest another:

Failure Mode: Lack of a Strategy for Managing Change

Even though inherently safer design and safety methods may be established, strategies for managing change are still needed. Many times we see safety systems installed in processes, but personell changes have occured, and the safety sytems and equipment are in fault condition, as the new personell do not understand the opperation of the safety equipment.